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Abstract
We consider a case of security design, where the optimal contract depends
on the nature of the future renegotiations game. It is shown that giving the
bargaining power to the debtor in the renegotiations game may not always
work in his interest.
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I   Introduction:
Recent work on security design1 has shown that the nature of the optimal financial
contract depends crucially on (among other things) renegotiations possibilities and the allocation
of bargaining power between the debtor and the creditor. In this context, different types of debt
contracts have received attention partly because of their simplicity and frequent use. A simple
debt contract will normally specify a loan amount which the debtor receives at the beginning to
finance some project and  repayment amount (s) which the debtor has to pay back at some
specified future date. The debt contract will also specify the creditor’s liquidation rights, the
amount of assets, which the creditor can liquidate if the debtor failed to meet the payment
obligation.  Two common features of the economic environment make the study of debt contracts
interesting. First, project returns are stochastic and for some realizations debtor  would not be
able to meet the repayment obligation. Second, liquidation is generally inefficient. The project
would fetch higher returns to the debtor in future than what the creditor could get by liquidating
it. Hence there is always the possibility of renegotiations at the repayment date. As is well known,
the outcome of the renegotiations and hence the initial contract between the two parties would be
sensitive to the distribution of the bargaining powers.
Suppose the debtor has all the bargaining power at the renegotiations stage. Such a debt
contract will be called a debtor-favored contract. It would appear that this possibly could not
harm the interest of the debtor. After all, loosely speaking , the debtor is not at the mercy of the
creditor. Of course, it has been noted that, in some cases this might dissuade the creditor from
extending any loan in the first place.  Given that the debtor could exploit his bargaining power in
the renegotiations game, the creditor might not achieve the minimum expected returns thus
rendering the debt contract infeasible2. But within the class of feasible debt contract, is it likely
that the debtor is worse off  with his bargaining power?  The  answer is yes. The aim of this note
is to show that under certain conditions a debtor is better off when the creditor has all the
bargaining power in the renegotiations game.
Section II  contains the basic model and the concepts. The main result and discussions are
in section III. Section IV concludes.
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 See Allen and Winton (95) for a survey.
2
 See Harris and Raviv (95) for more on this and an example of debtor-favored contract performing better
than the creditor-favored contract.
3II   The Model:
The basic model follows Harris & Raviv (95), and Hart & Moore (98). The debtor
(entrepreneur) needs a loan from the creditor (investor) to finance a project costing K in date 0.
The debtor has no initial capital. The project, lasting only two periods, leads to some verifiable
assets and non-verifiable returns at different future dates t = 1,2.. The returns depend on non-
verifiable state of nature s which is revealed at date 1. The state s completely determines the date
1 and date 2 returns. In addition, the liquidation value of the assets also depend on the state.  We
assume that there are only two states, s = 1,2. For simplicity the states occur with probability ½.
Let Rts denote the date t returns in state  s, t = 1,2 and s = 1,2. Similarly Ls refer to the liquidation
value of assets at date 1( asset has no value at date 2) in state s. We assume that assets are
divisible so that any fraction δ can be liquidated. If a fraction δ of the assets were to be liquidated
date 2 returns would be simply (1-δ)R2s. We make the following assumptions to focus on the
interesting cases.
A1: L1/ 2 + L2/2 ≥ K
A2:  1< R21/L1 < R22/L2    denote R2s/Ls = αs
A3: L1> L2, R11 ≥ R12
As we shall see, A1 guarantees that debt contracts are feasible even when the debtor has all the
bargaining power. A3 implies that the project returns are higher when the liquidation value is
high and the long-term returns of the project are higher than the short-term returns. A2 implies
the costly nature of liquidation. One can consider other cases as well, but we would like to focus
on cases where inefficient liquidation is a serious problem. Hence the state where the liquidation
value and first period returns are low also happens to be the state where liquidation is more
costly.
A debt contract specifies a loan N , repayment amount P and the creditor’s liquidation
rights following a default.  Given our earlier assumption of non verifiable returns and states, P is
not conditional on either. As the debtor has no initial wealth, the total amount borrowed by him is
N = K + T, where T is some transfer over and above the project cost. Following the literature we
can restrict attention to T only.  After the state is realized, the debtor can repay P or can default.
Once the debtor has defaulted, the creditor has total control over the assets and can liquidate any
amount. However, following default, the debtor and the creditor can renegotiate the payment to
be made by the debtor and the fraction of assets the creditor would liquidate. Let Cs and δs denote
the actual payment made by the debtor and the fraction of the assets liquidated. Given the
renegotiations possibilities, C and δ need not equal P and 1. Such renegotiations would make
4sense since α >1.  A debtor-favored debt contract (denoted as DF) means the debtor has all the
bargaining power in the renegotiations game. This is captured by allowing the debtor to make an
offer, which the creditor can accept or reject. If accepted, the offer is implemented. Upon
rejection the creditor has control over the assets and chooses to liquidate any amount. Likewise, a
creditor favored debt contract (CF) gives all the bargaining power to the creditor.   We allow for
the possibility that the debtor can liquidate part of the assets on his own to meet the repayment
obligation. Lastly, let M be the expected receipt of the creditor. Assuming market interest rate to
be zero, the creditor is willing to lend N only if M ≥ N.
In what follows we shall consider the case where the debtor is cash constrained in state 2
or R12  < L2. That leaves two possibilities in the other state, either R11 ≥ L1 or R11 < L1. The
analysis is broadly similar in either cases but the details are somewhat different. We restrict
attention to the case with R11 ≥ L1. Moreover we consider a special case of A1 and assume that
A1/ : L1/ 2 + L2/2 = K
Finding an optimal contract then boils down to choosing T and P to minimize the following
expected cost.
(1)  E(c) = ½[ C1 + δ1R21] + ½[ C2 + δ2R22]
E( c ) refers to the expected cost to the debtor. Note that this cost also includes the amount of
period 2 income forgone due to liquidation in period 1. There will be a series of constraints,
which the optimal choice of T and P would have to also satisfy. We shall introduce these as we
discuss the different contracts.
Debtor-favored Debt (DF): Since the debtor has the bargaining power, he would default
whenever P > Ls. After defaulting he will simply offer Ls to the creditor who will accept. Hence,
(2) Cs ≤ Ls
 So the maximum that the creditor can hope to get in each state is simply Ls.
(3) M ≤ L1/ 2 + L2/2
For the creditor to advance any loan, his participation constraint must be satisfied as well.
(4) M ≥ K+T
Finding the optimal DF contract boils down to minimizing (1) subject to the above constraints.
Given A1/, it can be seen that T = 0.  Since R11 ≥ L1, δ1 = 0 and δ2 = (L2 – R12)/L2.
 Creditor-favored Debt (CF): Now the creditor has the bargaining power. In the event of a
default, the creditor can extract as much cash as possible in exchange for parts or the whole of the
asset. Since the assets are more valuable to the debtor than the creditor, such trading will always
5take place. Moreover the extent of liquidation will be limited by the amount of cash being held by
the debtor. For any state s,
Cs ≤ (1-δs)R2s
According to our assumption, there will always be default in state 2. Moreover, depending on the
optimal transfer T* we can have either δ1> 0 or δ1 = 0. The latter is the case when R11+T* > R21.
We first deal with the case where R11+T* < R21 and discuss the other case later.
Case 1: R11+T* < R21. Finding the optimal CF contract boils down to minimizing (1) subject to
the following constraints.
(6) [R11 + T + δ1 L1]/2 + [R12 + T + δ2 L2]/2  ≥ K + T   (creditor’s participation constraint)
(7) R11 + T + δ1 R21 ≤ R21
(8) R12 + T + δ2 R22 ≤ R22
The last two constraints ensure that the debtor is willing to transfer all available cash to save on
liquidation in both states. These two will put upper bounds on the amount of liquidation that the
creditor can ask for, in addition to the available cash. Since liquidation is always inefficient, the
optimal contract will minimize the amount of liquidation. Since the debtor is cash constrained in
state 2 and always defaults, δ2 can be lowered by raising T.  Moreover, repayment can be made
higher in state 1 by allowing for some liquidation in that state , as liquidation is costlier in state2.
Hence constraint 2 will be always binding. Likewise creditor’s participation constraint is also
binding, as one can always raise T or lower state 1 payments. Given these two, minimizing δ2 will
be equivalent to maximizing T. The third constraint will also be binding as the creditor will try to
liquidate as much as possible. The optimal T as a result can be found to be
(9) T* = [R11(α1-1)α2 + R12(α2-1)α1]/ (α1+α2)
Once we know the optimal transfer, one can easily find the optimal P and consequent liquidation
amounts δs.
Case 2:  In this case, there is no liquidation in state 1. Here the constraints (6-8) will replaced by
the following
(6/) [P]/2 + [R12 + T + δ2 L2]/2  ≥ K + T
(7/) P ≤ R21
(8) R12 + T + δ2 R22 ≤ R22
At the optimum, P =R21, because by increasing payment in state 1 one can reduce liquidation in
state 2. One can proceed as before to find the optimal T in this case . It can be shown that
(10) T* = [α2 (R21 – L1)+ R12 (α2 –1) ]/ [α2 – 1]
The optimal contract will have T = T*, P = R21.
6III  Comparison of CF and DF contracts:
The analysis of the previous section can be used to compare the two types of debt contracts.  A
contract will be considered better if it leads to lower expected cost E(c). The following examples
illustrate how the optimal contracts are arrived at and would facilitate their comparison.
Example 1: Let  R11 = 100. R12 = 40, R21 =200,  R22 = 240 , L1 = 100, L2 = 60 and K = 80.
DF Contract:  Clearly T* = 0. Moreover P ≥ 100, as any P less than 100 would mean the
creditor’s participation constraint will be violated. Hence at the optimum T* = 0, P* = 100. Given
T and P, it can be checked that C1 = 100 and C2 = 40 and δ2 = (60-40)/60 = 1/3. There is no
liquidation in state 1. The expected cost to the debtor is given by
Edf ( c) =  ½[100] + ½[ 40 + 240/3] = 110.
CF Contract: Before we find the optimal contract, it can be shown that a CF contract can not
achieve a lower liquidation than the previous contract. Given default in state 2, the creditor will
offer to liquidate only δ2 in exchange for  the available cash (40+T) such that
40 + T ≤ (1-δ2) 240
Since it is in the interest of the creditor to maximize δ2 subject to the above constraint, we need T
≥120 for δ2 ≤ 1/3. So if the contract has to ensure a liquidation in state 2 smaller than the
corresponding liquidation under the DF contract, T must be greater than 120. But we shall show
that such a transfer is not feasible. For T = 120, creditor’s total receipts in state 2 is given by 160
+ 60/3 = 180. To satisfy the participation constraint of the creditor, the total receipts in state 1
must be  at least 220 as
½ [220] + ½[ 180] ≡ M = K + T ≡ 80 + 120
But the maximum that the creditor can get in state 1 is 200 as
100 + T ≤ (1-δ1) 200
Hence there is no CF contract for this example with δ2 ≤ 1/3. But this in itself does not imply that
the CF contract will imply a higher cost to the debtor. Given the transfer, the debtor might enjoy
large cash savings in state 1. This raises the possibility that the debtor’s expected cost can be
lower even with a higher δ2. However, notice that if the investor’s participation constraint is
binding in both cases the cash savings S is related to δ and can not be arbitrarily large
½ [C1 – T] + ½ [ 40 + δ2. 60] = 80
or, ½ [ 100 – S] + ½ [ 40 + δ2. 60] = 80,  S = 100 –C1 + T
So for a higher cash savings would mean a higher δ2. Given that δ2 carries more weight in the
debtor’s cost function, the optimal contract would be the one which achieves the smallest δ2.
7Since a CF contract can never achieve a smaller δ2 compared to the DF debt contract, it will also
imply higher expected cost.
In fact, the optimal CF contract in this case can be shown to be (T = 104, P = 200)3. This
leads to a liquidation of δ2 = 2/5  and no liquidation in state 1. The resulting expected cost is
given by
Ecf ( c ) = ½ [ 96 ] + ½ [ 40 + 2/5(240)] = 116 > 110.
This conforms to general belief that optimal DF contract would imply a lower cost to the debtor
compared to a  CF contract.
Let us consider another example, which is exactly same as the previous one except that
the long term returns in state 2 is lower.
Example 2: Let  R11 = 100. R12 = 40, R21 =200,  R22 = 180 , L1 = 100, L2 = 60 and K = 80.
DF contract: The analysis of the DF contract remains unchanged. The optimal DF contract will
have T = 0 and P = 100, resulting in C1 = 100, C2 = 60 and δ2 = 1/3. Hence the expected cost will
be given by
Edf ( c) =  ½[100] + ½[ 40 + 180/3] = 100.
The lower expected cost is due to the fall in opportunity cost of liquidation in state 2.
CF contract: Proceeding the same way as before, it can be seen that since R22 is smaller, a lower
transfer is required to ensure a smaller liquidation in state 2. Since
40 + T ≤ (1-δ2) 180
any T ≥ 80 would mean δ2 ≤ 1/3.  Such a transfer is feasible also. In state 2, creditor’s total
receipts are 140 and by setting P = 180 we can ensure that creditor’s participation constraint is
met for T = 80. There is no default in state 1 and C = P = 180. One can raise T beyond 80 also, as
the debtor would be willing to pay more in state 1. This would mean a lower liquidation in state
2.  The debtor can be made to pay more in state 1 where liquidation is less inefficient to subsidize
his income in state 2 (through a higher T) and save on the more inefficient liquidation in state 2.
Using the analysis of the previous section, the optimal contract in this case can be shown to be T
= 92, P = 196. This would mean the debtor would pay out all the cash (100 + 92) and liquidate
1/25 of the assets to meet the payment obligation in state 1. He does not benefit by defaulting as
100 + 92 = (1-1/25) 200. In state 2, the debtor defaults. Following renegotiations he pays (40 +
92) in exchange for 11/15 of the assets (or a liquidation of 4/15). It can be verified that the
creditor’s participation constraint is satisfied as well. The expected cost can be calculated the
same way.
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 This corresponds to the second case, hence T* is given by (10).
8Ecf ( c ) = ½ [ 100 + 200/25] + ½ [ 40 + 180(4/15)] = 98 < 100.
Hence, for this example, the CF contract is clearly less costly for the debtor.  In fact this is not an
isolated case. One can characterize the set of cases when the CF contract is less costly for the
debtor than the DF contract.
A simpler characterization is obtained if we restrict attention to cases where there is no
transfer (T = 0) under the DF contract. This is the case when K = (L1+L2)/2.
Proposition 1: Given assumptions A1-A3 and if the optimal CF contract entails some liquidation
in state 1 (case 1), then a CF contract implies a lower expected cost for the debtor (compared to
the optimal DF contract) if
(C1) (R11/R12) > (α2-1)/(α1-1). Where αs =R2s/Ls s = 1,2
Proof: It follows from (9) and the analysis of the DF contract that liquidation in state 2 will be
lower for a CF contract if the above condition holds. Given that the creditor’s participation
constraint is binding in both the cases and liquidation is more inefficient in state 2, this will also
imply that CF contract has a lower expected cost to the debtor.
It can be checked that this inequality is satisfied for example 2 but not example 1. The
only difference  between the examples is in the values of R22 and hence α2. As α2 is reduced from
its value of 4 in example 1 to a value of 3, the above condition holds and the CF contract does
better. The intuition behind this is quite straightforward. The main advantage of the CF contract is
two-fold . First  it allows for a high T and second it can enforce higher payments in state 1. In fact
some of the liquidation is transferred to this less inefficient state (recall that α1 <α2 ). A high T
would supplement the cash holdings in state 2 and help reduce liquidation. But note that given
our assumptions, there will always be default in state 2, which means the creditor can enforce
higher liquidation despite a  high T  if R22 is high. This is the disadvantage of passing the
bargaining power to the creditor. To ensure that there is less inefficient liquidation in state 2, R22
must not be too high. This is what the above condition stipulates.
 Case 1 does not hold when R11 is high or R21 is low. For case 2, it can be shown that the
above Proposition holds if condition C1 is replaced by the following condition4.
C2: (L1/R12) > (α2-1)/(α1-1). Where αj =Rj2/Lj    j = 1,2
Our analysis has so far assumed that there is no scope for any transfer T under DF
contract. However one can relax this assumption also. Let K = (L1+L2)/2 - t. So, the investor can
lend an amount T ≤ t over and above the project cost K.  This will certainly reduce the inefficient
liquidation in state 2 and improve the efficiency of the DF contract. If t is such that R12 +t > L2 ,
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 Let  R11 = 120. R12 = 40, R21 =150,  R22 = 165 , L1 = 75, L2 = 55 and K = 65. Here C1 holds but C2 does
not. It can be shown that CF leads to a higher cost.
9then it is possible (depending on R11) that there is no liquidation in state 2. However we shall
consider cases where it is not possible to eliminate inefficient liquidation altogether.  The CF
contract also becomes less costly but is not so straightforward. Hence we consider an example
(Example 2) and analyze how the two contracts fare as K is reduced. For given L1 and L2 , a
reduction in K5 would mean a rise in t.  As K falls, it is natural that E ( c) falls but the relative fall
in E (c) is higher for the DF contract than the CF contract. Hence  for sufficiently low K, the DF
will fare better and Proposition 1 does not hold.
Example 3: Let  R11 = 100. R12 = 40, R21 =200,  R22 = 180 , L1 = 100, L2 = 60 and K = 80 -t. This
is same as example 2 except for values of K.  The condition in Proposition 1 is also satisfied. We
shall see that as t gets large, Proposition 1 is not true anymore.
The analysis of optimal DF contract is easy . For K >60, there will always be a positive transfer T
= t. The state 1 payment equals 100 . In state 2, payment equals 40 + t and (60-40-t)/60 of assets
will be liquidated. It can be checked that it never pays to set T < t.
The analysis of the CF contract  depends on the value of t. It can be shown that for  t<10/3 , the
optimal transfer T = 92 + 12t/5. In state 1, the debtor pays back 100+t + δ1 (100), where δ1 =  (40-
12t)/1000 and in state 2 the debtor defaults. Following renegotiations, the debtor receives (1-δ2)
assets in exchange for a payment of 40 + t.  Hence there is liquidation in this state also with δ2 =
[48 –(12/5)t]/180. For t > 10/3, the optimal transfer T = 95 +3t/2 . There is no liquidation in state
1, the debtor pays 200. In state 2, the debtor pays 40 + t, in exchange for (1-δ2) of the assets,
where δ2 = [45-3t/2]/180.
Edf ( c) = [100 -t ]/2 + [40 + 3(20-t)]/2 = 100 –2t  for t <20
Ecf ( c) = [100+(40-12t)/5]/2 + [40+(48-12t/5)]/2 = 98 –12t/5 for t <10/3
= [200 –95 –3t/2]/2 + [40 +(45 – 3t/2)]/2 = 95 – 3t/2 for t >10/3
This shows that as K is lowered, Edf (c ) eventually falls at a faster rate than Ecf (c)  and for K <70
the DF contract is in fact better than the CF contract. This suggests that Proposition 1 applies to
situations where limited transfers are feasible in case of the DF contract. This shows that even
though Proposition 1 was derived in rather special conditions, it is far more general.
IV Conclusion:
We have shown that a debtor need not always benefit from having all the bargaining
power in the renegotiations game. In a similar vein, one can consider more generalized bargaining
games and show that a debtor’s welfare need not be monotonic in his bargaining power. This is
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 Note that t can be raised by raising L1 and L2 also and this will have different implications for the optimal
contracts. We do not consider such variations.
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somewhat similar to examples from labor economics and industrial organization, where agents
can be adversely affected by their bargaining power.
The paper abstracted from the source of such bargaining power, but in real life these will
be determined by factors like liquidation procedures, bankruptcy laws, union and labor laws. The
note points out that in designing these laws one has to carefully consider their implications  and
allow for the possibility that these laws may end up harming the agent whose interest was sought
to be promoted.
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